UK Competition Appeal Tribunal Judgment Derails CMA Mobile Browsers and Cloud Gaming Market Investigation
On 22 November 2022, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) decided to refer the supply of mobile browsers and mobile browser engines and the distribution of cloud gaming services through app stores on mobile devices for an in-depth ‘phase 2’ market investigation. The market investigation regime enables the CMA to investigate competition issues that affect an entire sector of the economy and provides it with extensive powers to remedy concerns that are found to exist.
Since the launch of the market investigation, the CMA inquiry team has published a 17-page issues statement and initiated wide-ranging research into consumer behaviour with respect to mobile browser use and the experience of web developers regarding browsers and browser engines. It has also sent out a large number of requests for information to industry participants. According to the CMA’s administrative timetable, it was due to publish working papers at any time and was in the process of scheduling hearings and site visits. In other words, by the start of this year, the investigation was in full swing, as it needed to be to meet the CMA’s case timetable for publishing its provisional findings in September or October this year, in time for its final report to be published before the statutory deadline of 21 May 2024.
On 18 January, Apple responded to the reference by applying to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) for a review of the CMA’s decision to launch the market investigation, claiming that it had not complied with the statutory timetable and was hence unlawful. Unfortunately for the CMA, in its judgment of 31 March, in Apple Inc. & Others v Competition and Markets Authority
In the words of the CMA’s press release accompanying its decision to launch a full market investigation
Notwithstanding the substantial reasoning to justify the reference set out by the CMA, however, this outcome was not always the plan. As is usual in such cases, the decision to launch a ‘phase 2’ market investigation was preceded by a ‘phase 1’ market study, which was initiated by a market study notice on 15 June 2021. Six months later, on 14 December 2021, the CMA issued a 445-page interim report
Nevertheless, the interim report explained that the CMA had decided to treat the market study in this case as an input into the new digital regulatory regime, under which its new Digital Markets Unit (‘DMU’) was poised to acquire new statutory powers to regulate technology companies with strategic market status (including Apple and Google) on an ex-ante basis. Not unreasonably, the CMA considered that the newly empowered DMU would “in principle be best placed to tackle the competition concerns identified by this market study” using its new regulatory powers. As a result, while the CMA expressly reserved the ability to revisit its position “if the legislation required to bring the proposed new regime into force is not laid before Parliament for some time, or its anticipated scope materially altered” (paragraph 9.12 of the interim report), it ultimately decided not to make a reference. Since the market investigation regime is essentially a tool to enable the CMA to implement sector-specific regulation, following in-depth investigations lasting 18 months, a decision to bypass a full reference when new regulatory powers for the whole technology sector were apparently within reach seemed reasonable in the context.
The formal decision not to make a reference
Given the clear decision not to refer, it came as somewhat of a surprise that the publication of the CMA’s final market study report on 10 June 2022 was accompanied by a separate document consulting on a new proposal to make a market investigation reference
The CAT’s judgment, in this case, turned on complex points of statutory interpretation. Before getting into these, the important issue to bear in mind, and the most likely source of the CMA’s error, is that it originally decided not to make a market investigation reference in this case and subsequently changed its mind. To echo Keynes, it did so because the facts had changed since its promised powers had not materialised. The question for the CAT was whether the law allowed it to do this.
While the CMA’s original decision not to make a reference was based on the assumption that it was about to acquire new powers that would have rendered a market investigation wasteful and unnecessary, the Government’s interminable delay in bringing forward the legislation for those powers revealed that decision to be ill-founded. As in many other areas of British life, the cumulative impact of Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic on the machinery of Government and the increasing dysfunction within the Cabinet in the run-up to Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s resignation in July 2022 threw a bag of spanners into the works, leading amongst other things to a log-jam of delayed legislation. While the CMA’s decision to change course in light of events is understandable in this context, as Apple correctly identified, the specific statutory framework governing the conduct of market studies preceding market investigations significantly constrained the CMA’s ability to do so.
In a crisp and well-reasoned judgment, the CAT examined the CMA’s decision to make the reference in light of the specific statutory provisions governing references following a prior market study, namely sections 131A and 131B of the Enterprise Act 2002
In the Government’s Response
As the CAT noted in its judgment, the effect of these two sections (which it described as constituting a “clear code”) is that, once the CMA has published a market study notice, it has six months to decide either: (i) not to make a market investigation reference, or (ii) to consult on a proposal to make a reference. As the CAT succinctly observed, in December 2021 the CMA opted for option (i).
Although both sides acknowledged that the CMA remained able to launch ‘standalone’ market investigations without undertaking a market study in certain circumstances, once it had triggered a market study by publishing a market study notice, sections 131A and 131B set out a binding timetable. That timetable required that any notice of a proposal to launch a market investigation had to be published (and the mandatory consultation period commenced) within six months of the original market study notice, i.e., by 15 December 2021. While the CMA’s original decision not to make a reference was in time, the subsequent notice of its proposal to make a reference and to commence consultation on 10 June 2022, i.e., almost a year after the market study notice, was well out of time. Since the timetable was set by the date of the original market study notice, the decision not to make an investigation (which the CAT described as “unequivocal”) was binding “in relation to the matter specified in the notice” and could not be substituted with a later decision to make a reference after all. The CAT, therefore, concluded that the decision was ultra vires, rendering the entire market investigation void. While the position would have been entirely different if the CMA had decided that it was minded to make a reference unless it acquired regulatory powers that provided it with better options, the CAT noted pointedly that it had not taken this approach.
Following Apple’s successful demolition of the legal basis for the current market investigation, the urgent question for the CMA and all interested parties to address is what happens next. The CMA responded on the same day of the judgment with an update on the case page, in which a spokesperson noted its disappointment with the judgment. The spokesperson went on to observe that the judgment placed “material constraints on the CMA’s general ability to refer markets for in-depth investigations” and risked “substantially undermining the CMA’s efficiently and effectively [to] investigate and intervene in markets where competition is not working well”. The statement concluded with confirmation that the CMA would be “considering our options including seeking permission to appeal”. No appeal has been launched at the time of writing.
While it would be natural to assume that the next best alternative to a successful appeal would be for the CMA either to make a new standalone reference under its wider section 131 powers or to start again and publish a new market study notice, either course of action appears to be blocked. As noted above, the fact that the CMA has made a market study notice in relation to mobile browsers and cloud gaming (ie the “matter specified” in that market study notice) means that the procedure specified in sections 131A and 131B applies and a standalone reference is excluded. Although the CAT accepted that the CMA would have the vires to issue a “fresh” market study notice that built on an earlier notice, issuing one on the same matter as a previous notice (as would be the case here), in the absence of a change of circumstances, may in the CAT’s view be challengeable on other public law grounds.
Given this, the CMA will no doubt be closely scrutinising the CAT’s suggestions in the judgment itself for resolving what it accepted was an “undesirable” outcome that “without good reason” constrained the CMA’s ability to make a reference. While the CAT’s guidance is (possibly intentionally) somewhat gnomic, it appears to suggest that, by purporting to issue a decision not to make a reference that was on its face categorical but in reality was subject to the qualifications that were set out in the CMA’s Interim Report, the CMA acted unlawfully. Specifically, the CAT indicated that “In concluding that the test for making a market investigation reference (…) was met but in declining to make such a reference only in the expectation of receiving further powers on the basis of a preliminary and (as it transpired) mistaken view of the potential for intervention, it might well be said that the CMA erred in law and/or took into account immaterial considerations”.
In other words, the CMA “did not have the option to decide not to make a reference at all with a reservation entitling it to revisit that decision at a later date”. Presumably, if the decision not to refer was unlawful and hence void (or the CMA chose to treat it as such), the block on the CMA revising its conclusions created by that decision would be removed and the CMA would be able to proceed with a new market study notice and, ultimately, a new referral. Such a course of action would hardly be quick, however, and would likely be fraught with additional legal uncertainty.
Fortunately for the CMA, the bill that promises finally to grant the CMA its long-awaited regulatory powers will also repeal the six-month time limit that was the authority’s undoing in this case. In the Government’s consultation document on its latest wide-ranging reforms to the competition and consumer regimes, entitled Reforming Competition and Consumer Policy
Although the Government’s plans to bring forward the bill to implement this proposal were confirmed in the Queen’s Speech on 10 May 2022 and in the Autumn Statement, at the time of writing, the draft bill has still not been published. In an irony that will not have been lost to the CMA, that same bill (the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill) will finally grant it the regulatory powers that were its original basis for deciding not to make a market investigation in this case. Assuming the bill finally makes it into Parliament this year, it remains possible that the CMA will simply abandon its market investigation altogether and take forward its work under its regulatory powers, as it originally intended. If it does so, the main value of this case may be to serve as a salutary lesson of the unexpected consequences of legislating for binding timetables for competition investigations and, more widely, the importance of good government for the entire administrative ecosystem.