2024 was the 15th anniversary for the Autorite de la concurrence, previously known as the Conseil de la concurrence (Press Release, 12 November 2024). This is a record anniversary. The French competition authority (“FCA”) had a “historical year” with “EUR1.4 Billion in fines imposed” (Press release, 15 January 202). As the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 13th July 2022 in the Illumina/Grail case (Illumina/Grail (C 611/22 P and C 625/22 P)) regarding the control of concentrations below thresholds, national competition authorities must step up efforts to effectively enforce merger control, which has thus been the case for the FCA, with a particularly active year in this regard, as well as in the fight against cartels.
Furthermore, the 2024-2025 roadmap (2024-2025 Roadmap) has laid out the main themes that will be at the heart of the FCA’s concerns for the upcoming years. Just like the Commission’s new Communication on the definition of relevant markets (Communication, 8 February 2024, C/2024/1645), digital markets and sustainability are increasingly present topics that need to be addressed. The FCA has seen a steady increase in the number of mergers it examines. In 2024, the FCA examined a record 295 mergers. Most of these operations, nevertheless, did not raise substantial difficulties, as of these decisions, 97% led to authorizations without commitments (
Press Release, 15 January 2025
).
One sector though has been under close observation, the food retail sector, notably with the acquisition of Casino stores by Intermarche (FCA, dec. ndeg 24-DCC-02, 11 January 2024;
FCA, dec. ndeg 24-DCC-255, 28 November 2024). Intermarche, which was aware of Casino’s economic problems, informed the FCA on 8 February 2024 of its intention to acquire 200 stores. After examining the transaction, the FCA has finally cleared the acquisition but subjected to the divesting of 11 stores to competitors to ensure sufficient alternatives for consumers (FCA, dec. ndeg 24-DCC-255, 28 November 2024).Other examples (for a full list, e.g. :
Press Release, 15 January 2025) of transactions authorized but subject to commitments include Canal Plus’ takeover of OCS and Orange Studio in the television sector (FCA, dec. ndeg 24-DCC-04, 12 January 2024), the takeover of Ludendo (la Grande Recre) assets by JoueClub in retail for toys (FCA, dec. ndeg 24-DCC-129, 19 June 2024).
An active fight against anticompetitive practices – cartels “For the fourth time in its history, the Autorite de la concurrence topped the symbolic threshold of EUR1 billion in cumulative fines in a single year. 2024, with a total fine of EUR1.4 billion, is the second highest year in terms of fines. This shows the Autorite’s commitment to combating anticompetitive practices. In fact, the majority of decisions were against cartels and anticompetitive agreements. These included: chocolate distribution (FCA dec. Press Release, 15 January 2025). : Press Release, 15 January 2025).
However, possible appeals will have to be looked out for, as the Paris Court of Appeal significantly reduced the 93 million euros fine imposed in 2020 in the cold meat products cartel (
FCA, dec. ndeg 20-D-09, 16 July 2020
) to 39 million euros, in a 7 March 2024 ruling (ndeg 20/13093), from 93 million to 39 million euros. The court considered the economic hardships of some companies when assessing the fine. The reduction in fines is not the first in recent years. It was also the case with the Apple case of 2022 (Main Developments of Competition Law and Policy in 2022 -France), for, among The FCA has been warned to carefully assess fines and justify them, taking into account the facts of every case presented to it. The FCA had previously imposed interim measures (FCA dec.ndeg20-MC-01, 9th April 2020) and sanctioned non-compliance (FCA dec.n Their aim was to restore the balance of power between these actors and Google, by establishing a binding negotiation framework tailored to the specificities of the press sector.These commitments were binding for a five-year period, but Google did not comply with them and was thus imposed a EUR250 million fine on the 15th of March 2024 (FCA, dec. ndeg 24-D-03, 15th March 2024).Firstly, Google did not comply with its obligation to cooperate with the appointed representative, by failing to provide him with all the information necessary to enable him to carry out his task of monitoring the commitments.Secondly, Google did not comply with its obligation to negotiate a remuneration offer to publishers and agencies according to transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria and to provide for the approved framework by not giving out the necessary information to them. Google created an informational imbalance by providing incomplete and opaque notes. Furthermore, it has reduced the remuneration base for publishers and press agencies by underestimating the indirect revenues resulting from the attractiveness of Google’s services through the display of protected press content and by excluding any form of remuneration for the display of press articles.Lastly, Google failed to comply with the commitments regarding the launch of its Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) service, Bard (ex-Gemini). Google violated the transparency obligation by keeping its co-contractors in dark about the use of their content (the “opt out” solution) and not offering them any way to oppose it. Hence, Google has failed to comply with the commitment regarding the obligation to ensure the neutrality of negotiations, risks posed by AI being increasingly under scrutiny, as highlighted by an FCA opinion from June 28, 2024 (FCA, opinion 24-A-05, 28 June 2024
). Measuring Artificial Intelligence’s competitive risks: the FCA opinionOn 28 June 2024, the ADLC issued its opinion on the competitive functioning of the generative artificial intelligence (“GAI”) sector (FCA, opinion 24-A-05, 28 June 2024
). The ADLC published its opinion on the competitive functioning of the generative artificial intelligence (“GAI”) sector on 28 June 2024 (
FCA, opinion 24-A-05, 28 June 2024
). ChatGPT). The report identifies first the different players who play different roles in the AI Value Chain.
The group includes the main digital players (Big Tech, Nvidia, E.g. The report identifies the different players in the AI value chain. 68-70), who have partnerships or links with Big Tech (Google and Anthropic with Open AI and Microsoft and Mistral AI; E.g. para. 71-74). Second upstream, suppliers of computer components are (Nvidia E.g. para. 76-80 or providers of digital cloud service (Amazon, Microsoft, E.g. para. 81-83). 90-94
).The FCA identifies two major advantages for companies that are induced by using AI: the implementation of barriers to market entry and the position of certain players on other markets in connection with AI (010010 90-94).
The FCA identifies two major advantages for companies induced by using AI: the implementation of barriers to market entry and the position of certain players on other markets in connection with AI (
E.g., para. 122
& f.). These advantages may lead to eight competitive risks, for which the FCA puts forward proposals.The first risk consists of abuse of computer components requiring the use of specialised processors (
E.g., para. 241-244
). To remedy this, FCA recommends that the supercomputer industry be democratised through investment (Proposal Ndeg 5;
E.g. para. 352 and opening up public supercomputer resources to businesses for a fee, in a nondiscriminatory manner, while maintaining priority for academic research (Proposal Ndeg 6; E.g. para Finaly, in relation to GAI models that are trained on public supercomputers there should be criteria for openness, while maintaining a connection with the AI Act. (Proposal Ndeg 7;
E.g. para 354).The second risk under consideration is the lock-in by major cloud service providers (E.g., para 245-252), closely related to data access risks (E.g., para. 253-264). The FCA recommends that the economic value of data be taken into consideration by rights holders (Proposal Ndeg 8; E.g. para. 359). The FCA also recommends that data be made more accessible for training and fine tuning of IAG models. 361).Other risks are related to access, first to skilled labour (E.g., para. Other risks are related to access, firstly, to skilled labour (e.g., para. 278-282). In fact, the position of some players on markets that are linked to GAI can lead to several types of risks, and in particular anticompetitive behavior. In fact, there are certain risks associated with companies’ presence in multiple markets, resulting from their advantages of vertical and conglomerate integration as well as privileged access to inputs (e.g., par. In fact, there are risks associated with the presence of companies in several distinct markets, stemming from the advantages derived from their vertical and conglomerate integration, as well as privileged access to inputs (
E.g. para. 292-294, which can lead to collusion among companies in the sector. In this case, the Commission may request information from gatekeepers regarding minority shareholdings in the same sector in accordance with Article 14 DMA concerning the obligation to report concentrations. (Proposal Ndeg 10; E. 364).
Lastly, the FCA has put forward three proposals concerning the relationship with other regulations. In 334). The 336). The 337). The 348).In conclusion, “The Autorite will continue to explore the use of artificial intelligence to support its own procedures, in cooperation with the sector-specific authorities, administrations, an courts concerned” (2024-2025 Roadmap), such as the CNIL. The On another topic, the FCA also worked hand in hand with the French energy regulator (CRE) and the French transport regulator (ART), to promote sustainability.
Promoting sustainability for the futureThe FCA has been involved in supporting the ecological transition for the past few years, 2024 marking a big step in that direction, notably with the organisation of a workshop on “The Role of Competition in Supporting Sustainable Development Goals” on the 2d of July 2024 (ICN 2024 Workshop on sustainability).Moreover, after having launched a public inquiry on the competitive dynamics of the electrical vehicle charging infrastructure sector in 2023 (Main Developments in Competition Law and Policy 2023 – France; E-mobility : FCA questionnaires
), the FCA finally issued its opinion on 30 May 2024 (Press Release, 11 June 2024; FCA, opinion 24-A-03, 30 May 2024), inspired by the 81 answers and the collaboration with the French energy and transports regulators (CRE & ART). The This diversity sometimes create regional disparities that should be tackled “by creating an inter-ministerial body to ensure coordination between the different owners, and planning and monitoring of deployment at national level” (Press Release, 11 June 2024).Furthermore, the FCA underlined the opacity of prices charges and thus advocates for a greater pricing transparency politic by requiring the adoption of a kilowatt-hour pricing model to help consumers compare costs more easily as well as the display of information transparently, distinguishing on the MSP’ websites or any other commercial medium between the price per kWh, per charging station and any other applicable fees (Press Release, 11 June 2024).Regarding interoperability, it is advised to ensure compatibility between collective charging infrastructures and individual charging solutions to prevent user captivity and promote fair competition. The FCA also emphasized the need to monitor the Distribution Network Operator’s or the CO’s involvement in the sector, particularly regarding the promotion of its own solutions and potential misuse of privileged information and warned against the excessive use of exclusivity clauses.
These potential competitive risks thus require vigilance to maintain competition on the merits and foster innovation, and to help consumers change habits towards a greener energy economy.On this topic, it is also worth noting that the FCA issued a first informal guidance on sustainability in the animal nutrition sector following the request of two professional organisations (Press Release, 2 July 2024 ; FCA, Informal guidance 24-DD-01, 14 June 2024), a second one having been issued this February on the creation of a system for the collective financing of the additional costs and risks associated with the agro-ecological transition (Press Release, 5 February 2025; FCA, Informal guidance 25-DD-01, 25 January 2025).
Conclusion[…]As the 2024-2025 Roadmap points out, “the French and European economies face a number of challenges: consolidating growth, reindustrialising, achieving the energy transition, and asserting sovereignty in an increasingly fragmented world. The The
Story originally seen here
