Credibility at Issue? Court May Compel Party Representative to Appear In Person | McDermott Will & Emery
Addressing for the first time whether a district court can compel a witness to appear in person for testimony involving fraud on the court, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that it could require an in-person appearance of the sole corporate representative to make a credibility determination. Backertop Licensing LLC v. Canary Connect, Inc., Case Nos. 23-2367; -2368; 24-1016; -1017 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2024) (Prost, Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)
During an underlying litigation, the US District Court for the District of Delaware identified potential party and attorney misconduct in dozens of patent cases related to IP Edge and Mavexar, a patent monetization firm and an affiliated consulting firm, respectively. The district court found that IP Edge and Mavexar appeared to have created LLCs, recruited individuals to serve as the sole owners, assigned patents to the LLCs for “little or no consideration,” and recorded the complete assignment of patent rights without disclosing that IP Edge and Mavexar retained significant rights to the royalties and to any settlement proceeds resulting from litigation of the assigned patents. The LLCs then filed lawsuits asserting the rights of their assigned patents without reporting the significant rights retained by IP Edge and Mavexar.
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to “gather more information about its concerns” over potential professional misconduct violations and real parties in interest not being identified. One of the parties was Backertop Licensing LLC and its sole owner, Lori LaPray. The district court ordered the production of documents related to the potential fraud on the court and a declaration identifying “any and all assets owned by Backertop.” Shortly thereafter, Backertop filed a joint stipulation of dismissal, and two attorneys for Backertop sought to withdraw from their representation. The district court’s investigation continued, however, and Backertop’s “allegedly responsive production” contained documents, several of which “had clearly missing attachments or cover letters.”
Left unsatisfied with the production, the district court ordered LaPray to appear in person for a hearing to “assess her credibility.” Citing preexisting travel plans, a busy work schedule and childcare obligations, LaPray notified the court that she was unable to attend the hearing as scheduled and requested to appear telephonically instead. The district court moved the hearing date to accommodate LaPray’s travel schedule but required in-person appearance because “[c]redibility assessments are difficult to make over the phone.” Backertop argued, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration that the court’s order was precluded under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 geographic limit. The district court rejected the argument because Rule 45 does not limit the court’s inherent power to order parties to appear sua sponte. After failing to appear at the rescheduling hearing and the show cause hearing, the district court held LaPray in civil contempt and imposed a $200 per day fine until she appeared in person in court. Backertop and LaPray appealed.
The Federal Circuit concluded that Rule 45’s geographic limit only applies to a party or attorney’s efforts to subpoena a person to attend a trial in person and does not apply to the court. The Court reasoned that “the absence of an express limit on sua sponte court orders in FRCP 45 alone is dispositive.” This is also supported by the history of Rule 45 and the fact that the rule allows for imposition of sanctions, which would “be illogical if applied to a court’s own orders.”
As to the issue of the contempt order itself, the Federal Circuit found that ordering LaPray, the sole corporate representative of Backertop, to appear in person was not an abuse of discretion. The Court explained that the district court found that a credibility determination needed to be made and that doing so necessitated an in-person appearance by the sole corporate representative. The Court stated that compelling LaPray’s appearance was within the discretion of the district court.
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